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85-2669/11

OLL 85-2192/1
30 July 1085

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD   60 - 4

SUBJECT: SSCI Hearing (September 1985) on Security and
          Counterintelligence/Director of Security Briefing
          for SSCI Staffers

REFERENCE: OLL 85-2192; 26 July 1985

1. On 30 July, the Director of Security gave a briefing
on the CIA Personnel Security Program to three of the four
SSCI staffers who are preparing for SSCI hearings on
security and counterintelligence to be conducted in
September 1985.   The following individuals participated:

CIA: [   ] Director of Security   25X1
      [   ] eputy Director for
      Personnel Security and Investigations

      [   ] OLL   25X1
      [   ] OLL   25X1

SSCI: Ed Levine
       John Elliff
       Charles Battaglia

Jim Dykstra, the fourth SSCI staffer involved in planning
for the hearing, did not attend the briefing.

2. Elliff opened the over two-hour session with a
restatement of the factors that led up to the hearing, and
the intent of the Committee to be constructive in resolving
security problems (see reference). He stated that the staff
wants to advise Members after the August recess how to
interface more effectively with the Executive Branch.

3. [   ] gave a comprehensive overview of the   25X1
functions and organization of the Office of Security (OS).
The following subjects were covered:

Organization

A. Positions: [   ] (officer, technical and clerical)   25X1
                in OS; plus [   ] area security   25X1
                officers in components;

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Structure: D/SEC reports directly to DDA; has
direct contact as needed with DCI,
DDCI and EX/DIR.

B.   Four Functional Directorates:

Personnel Security and Investigations

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Is most important and largest division because of the
critical need for reliable and trustworthy people.   Every
individual who will have access to CIA classified
information must have OS clearance and approval.   While
small compared to FBI and DIS, CIA's program is the
strongest in the nation.   We have had our own investigative
apparatus since the 1950's and need not rely on any other
agency.

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C.   Policy and Management Division

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D.   Technical Security Division

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explained the rationale for this new
division.   It will be responsible for an interdisciplinary
survey of the wide variety of types of technical
penetration.   Its responsibilities include communication
security, computer security,   and
technical countermeasures surveys.

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E.   Physical and Area Security

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This division is charged with facility security of all
domestic and overseas sites where our people and data are.
It has surveys and inspections of overseas, domestic and
industrial locations, looks at security standards for all
work areas and many overseas residences, and monitors people
overseas.

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4. Of particular interest to the staffers was the relationship and division of labor between the Counterintelligence Staff and the Security Analysis Group. Mr. [ ] stressed that the two groups worked together very closely and that the Security Analysis group focussed on less serious, non-CI matters. He described this group as 12 hand-picked, highly-skilled professional officers who maintained close communication with the CI staff and, except for one-on-one polygraphs, conducted joint interviews whenever appropriate. There were a few questions regarding the Scranage Case and [ ] clarified Agency reactions which appear to the staffers as inadequate.

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5. [ ] took this occasion to stress the Agency's interest in leaks legislation, and in an interagency polygraph school. The staffers were mildly responsive and noncommittal.

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6. The rest of the briefing was a straightforward description of applicant security approval procedures and policy. [ ] discussed the typical steps in clearance, the value of psychological testing, use of polygraph, the reasons for security disapprovals, the difference between security and suitability issues, and the value of the extensive background investigation which includes checks on applicants' neighborhoods.

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7. The staffers indicated that they found the briefing very helpful, would have liked to have gone on another few hours, and would likely request additional CIA security briefings.

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Acting Chief, Liaison Division, OLL

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OLL:LD: [ ]   (22 August 1985)

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OLL 85-2552
23 August 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing for GAO Staffers on CIA Training of
           Polygraphers

1.   On 5 August, representatives of Polygraph Division,
Office of Security, briefed GAO staffers on CIA training of
polygraphers. The following individuals participated in the
briefing:

CIA: Chief, Polygraph Division   25X1
                                        Deputy Chief, Polygraph
                                           Division
                                        Chief, Polygraph Training
                                           and Research
                                        Office of Legislative Liaison

GAO: Irving Boker
       Wanda Avila
       Uldis Adansons

2.   The Senate Armed Services Committee has requested a
GAO evaluation of DOD polygrapher training and the
feasibility of expanding that training. To that end, GAO is
meeting with other organizations that conduct polygrapher
training. GAO must provide a report to the Committee by the
end of this calendar year. The GAO staffers agreed to
consider the briefing at the SECRET level and to coordinate
a draft report with CIA prior to publication.

3.   The history of CIA polygrapher training was
reviewed. The polygraph program was started in 1949 and
through the early 1950's most CIA polygraphers were trained
at the Leonard Keeler Institute in Chicago. Over the years,
CIA developed in-house tutorial training tailored to Agency
needs to screen applicants and agents. We had a formal
curriculum and no formal school. In 1976-77, CIA went to
the John Reed School in Chicago for basic training and
apprenticeship, and had follow-up in-house training tailored
to CIA practices.

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4. In late 1982, we had the first CIA polygrapher class and the seventh class will begin in September. We have averaged four students to a class and will have 12 next September. The course now lasts 15 1/2 weeks. In it there are many practical exercises and videotape is used. There are 11 weeks of classroom instruction, occasional monitoring of live cases, and in the last four weeks students run live cases at Headquarters under close supervision of instructors. The school is accredited, and it meets or exceeds all APA requirements.

5. In lieu of a formal apprentice program, students are turned over to a Headquarters line supervisor, and are closely watched. New polygraphers begin with applicants, then move on to the more complex polygraph examinations including the reinvestigation program, overseas, and industrial polygraphs.

6. CIA polygraphers are very carefully screened. All meet the standards, including a college degree, for employment with OS and their aptitudes and motives are carefully assessed. Only one student has not been able to complete the training and he was reassigned by mutual agreement. Most polygraphers come from the Security career service, work an average of four years as polygraphers, and move onto another OS discipline. We turn down many commercial examiners who apply for employment because of their inadequate training, lower standards, and emphasis on criminal investigation. (CIA does no criminal investigative polygraph testing, with the rare exception of some internal exams.) All polygraphers are volunteers, there is no age requirement, and many more individuals apply than are accepted. It is estimated that out of 150 files reviewed over the course of one year, we accept six. We have a current strength of around ☐ polygraphers and our goal is to have ☐ line examiners.

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7. CIA exercises very formalized quality control procedures. No examiner, irrespective of grade or position, is exempt from having the chart checked while the subject is still in the room. When the charts are approved, the subject is released. All differences of opinion are discussed and resolved. This, of course, is not a viable procedure in the field; charts are returned to Headquarters, reviewed, and decisions are upheld or overturned. There are six to eight examiners under one supervisor; there is no need to keep statistics on the results of polygraph reviews because of this small span of control. On the average, a polygrapher completes two applicant polygraphs a day, one in the morning and one in the afternoon.

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8. There was some discussion of the differences between
CIA and DOD polygraph training and application.

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Acting Chief, Liaison Division, OLL

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Original - OLL Record
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OLL:LD:[   ] (26 August 1985)   25X1

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OLL 85-2556
8 August 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing on CIA Selection Process and Security
Approval for Andrew Feinstein, Staff Director,
Civil Service Subcommittee/House Post Office,
Civil Service Committee

1. On 8 August, I gave a two-hour briefing to Andrew
Feinstein, Staff Director, Civil Service Subcommittee/House
Post Office, Civil Service Committee. Feinstein initially
requested a briefing on the CIA personnel selection process
with emphasis on security approval and stated that his
committee had jurisdiction over such matters and that he was
involved with the "Stilwell Commission". After several
telephone conversations, Feinstein revised his request: he
sees that personnel security is a hot issue today and he
wants to be informed because there is a chance that relevant
legislation will eventually be referred to his Committee.
As for the Stilwell Commission, he is scheduled to interview
one of the participants on 9 August.

2. At the outset of the briefing, I stated that we were
willing to talk with him in the context of cooperation
because his Committee very likely would deal with
legislation on some aspect of personnel security. I
clarified that HPSCI had direct jurisdiction over CIA policy
and procedures, but we were concerned over personnel
security government wide, and over potential legislation and
other activity in the wake of recent espionage revelations.
I also stated that he should treat the overall briefing as
secret and for his background information only. He agreed
to check with me prior to making any use of the information.

3. I presented general and anecdotal information and
avoided specifics and legal issues lest they come back to
haunt us. I gave an overview of the selection process and
emphasized CIA's policy of considering the whole person for
employment and basing hire/no hire decisions on multi-sourced
information. Of particular interest to Feinstein was our
use of psychological testing, the initial security
indoctrination, security awareness programs and security
counseling.

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4. Insofar as CIA personnel security practices, I para-phrased the guidelines published in DCI Directive 1/14. As for our use of psychological testing, I offered general information on the categories of employees who were tested, and on the value of the results in assessing performance potential and suitability. I dispelled him of the notion that it was possible to readily detect a "spy" from the results of a battery of tests.

5. Feinstein said he was satisfied and requested no additional briefings.

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Acting Chief, Liaison Division, OLL

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP	DATE 31 Jul

TO: DDA	

ROOM NO.	BUILDING 1985

REMARKS:

EXO/DDA _Bu 31-7_

ADDA _31 JUC 1985_

DDA _31 AUG 1985_

DDA REGISTRY _____

OS RECEIVED A COPY.

FROM:	

ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 56

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

**Deputy Director
for Administration**

D/OLL c52

Chuck,

I am sure you
have seen this.

Thanks. In fact, I had not.

↓

DDA

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85-2669

OLL 85-2192
26 July 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

60-4

SUBJECT: SSCI Hearing (September 1985) on Security and
Counterintelligence/Preparatory Discussion Between
Director of Security and Charles Battaglia

1. On 26 July, Charles Battaglia, SSCI staffer, and
[   ] Director of Security, met to discuss CIA
support for SSCI hearings on Security and counterintelli-
gence to be held in September 1985.

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2. Battaglia explained that the genesis for the
hearings included the Chairman's interest in pursuing the
subject with the possibility of developing tighter
legislation, the Walker case which has stimulated widespread
interest, and the Byrd resolution which called for a
national commission to look into the issues, a move the SSCI
wanted to block. Battaglia stated that the SSCI is working
with the Administration in this endeavor; scheduled next
week is a strategy meeting with the National Security Policy
Group, National Security Council. [   ] advised that
security problems already have extremely high visibility and
now the need is to orchestrate the multitude of groups (e.g.
Inman Panel, Gen. Stilwell group) that are working the
issues. Battaglia agreed that the SSCI should build on
previous work and avoid duplication and overlap whenever
possible. He stated than an expected outcome from the
hearings would be some immediate and long-term solutions to
security problems. He described the mood in Congress to be
very positive,--that the Members want to help rather than
get in the way of security professionals who can do the job
with adequate funding.

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3. Battaglia stated that he wanted briefings in
personnel security (a broad perspective of policy and
procedures), information security and industrial security.
Eventually, he wants to be able to compare the approaches
used by different Intelligence Community elements. Examples
he cited are the screening programs (human reliability, use
of psychological testing), and background investigations
(the extensive CIA background investigation vs. DOD's IBI
interview format). Physical/technical security, with the
exception of its functions in industrial security, will not
be a primary subject in the hearings.

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4. It was agreed that [   ]will brief (30 July, 1000 at SSCI) on CIA's personnel Security program. As time and interest warrant, he will cover CIA's polygraph program. Battaglia expects the three or four other staffers involved in the hearing to attend.

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5. Also discussed was CIA's use of psychological testing as a screening tool. [   ]underscored its importance and stated that most agencies did vocational testing rather than the more complex analysis conducted by CIA. Battaglia wants a briefing on the CIA program.

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6. Battaglia mentioned that he was highly impressed with the SSCI security procedures with the exception of use of the telephone. He stated that there is only one secure phone in Committee offices and he is the only one that uses it. [   ]stated Agency willingness to assist in having more secure phones installed and Battaglia said he did not want to pursue this now but would at a later time.

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Liaison Division

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Acting Chief, Liaison Division, OLL

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     1 - [   ] Chrono

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